@clack/core
Clack contains low-level primitives for implementing your own command-line applications.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:fast-wrap-ansi | AI (dependencies): Minor ANSI text-wrapping utility; stable dependency in this well-established package with SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:./dist/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): @clack/core ships a minified CJS bundle as its distribution artifact via unbuild. Long lines are minification artifacts, not obfuscation. Stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:fast-wrap-ansi | AI (phantom-deps): fast-wrap-ansi is a legitimate ANSI text-wrapping utility; phantom-dep finding is expected for bundled ESM packages where deps are inlined into dist output. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with strong publisher track record; lack of Sigstore attestation is a process gap, not a security indicator for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): @clack/core is a legitimate, long-established CLI prompt library under the bombshell-dev org. The Levenshtein match to 'cors' is purely coincidental — different scope, purpose, and ecosystem footprint. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:sisteransi | AI (phantom-deps): sisteransi is a declared runtime dep; phantom detection likely reflects build config usage. Not a security concern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package transitioned to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance attestation — a supply chain improvement, not a compromise indicator. Repo URL matches known bombshell-dev/clack project. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:picocolors | AI (phantom-deps): picocolors is a declared runtime dep; phantom detection likely reflects build config usage. Not a security concern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 41 of 41)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.3.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.3.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.5.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.4.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.4.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.3.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.3.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.9 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.8 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.7 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.6 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.12 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.11 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.10 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.9 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.8 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.7 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.6 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 5 |
v1.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: natemoo-re.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: natemoo-re.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: natemoo-re.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.