@christiandoxa/prodex-darwin-x64
Native prodex binary for x86_64-apple-darwin
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform binary package; vendor/prodex is the intended native binary artifact, attested via SLSA provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 227)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.122 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.121 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.120 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.119 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.118 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.117 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.116 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.115 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.114 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.113 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.112 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.111 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.110 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.109 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.108 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.107 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.106 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.105 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.104 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.103 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.102 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.101 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.100 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.99 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.98 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.97 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.96 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.122
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.121
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.120
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.119
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.118
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.117
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.116
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.115
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.114
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.113
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.112
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.111
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.110
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.109
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.108
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.107
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.106
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.105
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.104
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.103
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.102
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.101
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.100
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.99
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.98
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.97
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.96
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.