@choice-ui/search-input
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@choice-ui/shared | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo sibling package; consistent naming convention with other approved @choice-ui deps. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Young design system package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.8 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.7 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.6 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.5 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.4 | 5 / 7 |
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.