@canonical/styles-modes-intents
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@canonical/tokens | AI (phantom-deps): CSS-only package; @canonical/tokens is a design-token dep consumed at build time, not via JS imports. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Canonical design-system CSS package; sparse README and no keywords are typical for internal org packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.26.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.25.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.24.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.23.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.10.0 | 1 / 2 |
v0.26.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.24.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.