@bytecodealliance/jco
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance present; gitHead absence reflects CI change, not a supply-chain concern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Bytecode Alliance transitioned to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance attestation. This is a legitimate and security-improving change, not a compromise. | ai | |
| license | uncommon-license:LLVM-exception | AI (license): Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception is a well-known permissive license used throughout the LLVM/Rust ecosystem; no legal concern for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:obj/js-component-bindgen-component.js | AI (source-diff): Base64 strings are inline WASM module binaries loaded via WebAssembly.compile(). Standard pattern for jco's WASM component bindgen tooling; not malicious obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:obj/wasm-tools.js | AI (source-diff): Base64 strings are inline WASM module binaries loaded via WebAssembly.compile(). Standard pattern for jco's wasm-tools JS bindings; not malicious obfuscation. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): @bytecodealliance/jco is a scoped package from the Bytecode Alliance for WebAssembly tooling; levenshtein match to 'joi' is a false positive with no plausible confusion. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:binaryen | AI (phantom-deps): binaryen is a declared runtime dependency used for WASM optimization; phantom detection is a false positive for this package's usage pattern. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decode is used to load embedded WASM modules via WebAssembly.compile() — standard and documented pattern for WASM-in-JS bundles. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:eval-usage | AI (semgrep): eval('import(...)') is a known ESM dynamic import workaround used to conditionally load one of two compatible versions of componentize-js; not an attack vector. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ora | AI (phantom-deps): ora is conditionally loaded via the #ora import map (browser shim vs native); phantom-dep detection doesn't account for import map indirection. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:mkdirp | AI (phantom-deps): mkdirp is a declared runtime dependency used in build/CLI tooling; phantom detection is a false positive for this package's usage pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 31 of 31)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.20.0 | 9 / 13 | |
| 1.19.0 | 8 / 13 | |
| 1.18.1 | 8 / 13 | |
| 1.18.0 | 8 / 13 | |
| 1.17.9 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.17.8 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.17.7 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.17.6 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.17.5 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.17.4 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.17.3 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.17.2 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.17.1 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.17.0 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.16.1 | 7 / 15 | |
| 1.16.0 | 7 / 15 | |
| 1.15.4 | 7 / 15 | |
| 1.15.3 | 7 / 14 | |
| 1.15.2 | 7 / 14 | |
| 1.15.1 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.15.0 | 7 / 13 | |
| 1.14.0 | 8 / 16 | |
| 1.13.3 | 8 / 16 | |
| 1.13.2 | 8 / 16 | |
| 1.13.1 | 8 / 16 | |
| 1.13.0 | 8 / 16 | |
| 1.12.0 | 8 / 16 | |
| 1.11.3 | 8 / 16 | |
| 1.11.2 | 8 / 16 | |
| 1.11.1 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.11.0 | 8 / 12 |
v1.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.19.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.18.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.18.0
3 findingsModified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.17.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.16.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.16.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: vados.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.15.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: vados.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.14.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: vados.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.13.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: vados.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.13.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: vados.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.13.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: vados.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.13.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: vados.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.12.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: vados.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.11.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.