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@builder.io/buildercode-darwin-arm64

npm

Builder Code binary for darwin arm64

5
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

steve8708samijaberteleaziz123mrkoreyemheverygustavohgsmanucorporatsanyamkamatbengironekylefowlerbuilderio-botarmelaaishwarya_parabemmaacsidmohanty11jcortesebuildervishwasgopinathnicholaskoechfloating_dynamopaprikafpabloelisseoliamdebeasi

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with CI/CD automation for a Builder.io org package. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-removed AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal aligns with org-level CI/CD publishing transition; no malicious indicators. ai
npm-metadata bundled-binaries AI (npm-metadata): rg is ripgrep, a standard search binary legitimately bundled in code/IDE tooling by Builder.io. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary sub-packages routinely lack repo links, keywords, and deps — this is a structural pattern, not spam. ai

Versions (showing 5 of 5)

Version Deps Published
0.6.4 0 / 0
0.5.5 0 / 0
0.5.4 0 / 0
0.5.1 0 / 0
0.4.19 0 / 0

v0.6.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: pabloelisseo → GitHub Actions (on 2026-06-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.5.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: pabloelisseo → GitHub Actions (on 2026-06-10) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.5.4

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: manucorporat → pabloelisseo (on 2026-06-09, known maintainer) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (pabloelisseo) than the most recent previously approved version (manucorporat) on 2026-06-09, but pabloelisseo is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.5.1

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rg

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.4.19

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.