@bugsnag/plugin-network-breadcrumbs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Bugsnag monorepo sub-package; sparse README and no keywords are expected for internal plugin packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bugsnag/request-tracker | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same Bugsnag monorepo; not a third-party risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.9.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 8.8.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 8.8.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 8.6.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 8.4.0 | 0 / 1 |
v8.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.