@bugsnag/node
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:zod | AI (typosquat): @bugsnag/node is a legitimate Bugsnag SDK package with no relation to 'zod'; the Levenshtein match is a superficial false positive that will never represent a real typosquat risk for this scoped package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.9.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 8.8.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 8.6.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 8.4.0 | 6 / 13 |
v8.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.