@branchmore/cli-darwin-arm64
macOS arm64 binary for @branchmore/cli
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific CLI binary package; bundled binary is the intended artifact, backed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD is expected for automated binary releases with SLSA attestation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer addition consistent with legitimate team/org expansion alongside CI/CD automation transition. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is the conventional version for platform-specific binary sub-packages; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): No deps/keywords and tiny payload are expected for a platform binary stub package. | ai |
v0.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/bmor
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.