@bitgo/sdk-coin-cspr
BitGo SDK coin library for Casper
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ethersproject/bignumber | AI (phantom-deps): Same pattern — monorepo barrel export usage, stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash | AI (phantom-deps): TypeScript monorepo; deps used transitively or via barrel exports, not direct imports. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:secp256k1 | AI (phantom-deps): Same pattern — monorepo barrel export usage, stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bignumber.js | AI (phantom-deps): Same pattern — monorepo barrel export usage, stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:casper-js-sdk | AI (phantom-deps): Same pattern — monorepo barrel export usage, stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/statics | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; stable false positive for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stablelib/hex | AI (phantom-deps): Same pattern — monorepo barrel export usage, stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; stable false positive for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bitgo/secp256k1 | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; stable false positive for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): BitGo monorepo packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this publisher. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bitgo/sdk-core | AI (dependencies): First-party BitGo dependency; stable pattern across all sdk-coin-* packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 71 of 71)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.6.16 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.15 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.14 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.13 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.12 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.11 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.10 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.9 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.8 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.7 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.6 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.5 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.4 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.3 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.2 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.6.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.5.9 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.5.8 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.5.6 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.5.5 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.5.4 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.5.3 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.5.2 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.5.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.5.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.24 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.22 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.21 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.20 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.19 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.18 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.17 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.16 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.15 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.14 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.13 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.12 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.11 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.10 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.9 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.8 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.7 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.6 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.5 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.4 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.3 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.2 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.4.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.15 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.14 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.13 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.12 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.11 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.10 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.9 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.8 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.7 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.6 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.5 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.4 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.3 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.2 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.2.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.1.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.0.82 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.0.81 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.0.80 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.0.79 | 9 / 3 | |
| 2.0.78 | 9 / 3 |
v2.6.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.7
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (pranavjain) than the most recent previously approved version (zahin-mohammad) on 2025-07-15, but pranavjain is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zahin-mohammad) than the most recent previously approved version (mohammadalfaiyaz_bitgo) on 2025-06-02, but zahin-mohammad is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.82
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zahin-mohammad) than the most recent previously approved version (mohammadalfaiyaz_bitgo) on 2025-05-28, but zahin-mohammad is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.81
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.80
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.79
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.78
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.