@better-fetch/fetch
Advanced fetch wrapper for typescript with zod schema validations, pre-defined routes, hooks, plugins and more. Works on the browser, node (version 18+), workers, deno and bun.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; legitimate automation change. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped package under @better-fetch; missing description is cosmetic, not malicious. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established package (3M downloads, 67 versions); low-value signals are false positives. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 1.2.2 | 0 / 15 | |
| 1.2.1 | 0 / 15 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 1.1.21 | 0 / 15 | |
| 1.1.19 | 0 / 15 |
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.