@base-org/account
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package migrated from manual npm publish (base-npm) to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance attestation — a supply chain improvement, not a compromise. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/base-account.js | AI (source-diff): Long hex strings are EVM contract deployment bytecode constants (deploylessCallViaBytecodeBytecode etc.) — standard pattern in smart account SDKs, not obfuscated payloads. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/base-account.min.js | AI (source-diff): This is a minified browser bundle; long strings are minified JS code, not encoded payloads. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/sign/base-account/utils/createSmartAccount.js | AI (source-diff): Long hex string is a WebAuthn stub signature for ERC-4337 smart account — standard pattern in account abstraction SDKs. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:ox | AI (dependencies): ox is a well-known Ethereum primitives library by the Viem/wagmi team; its use alongside viem in a Web3 SDK is expected and legitimate. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Absence of Sigstore provenance is common (~88% of npm packages lack it); no other risk signals elevate this concern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.5.6 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.5.5 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.5.4 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.5.3 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.5.2 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.5.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.5.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.4.2 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.4.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.4.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.3.1 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.3.0 | 9 / 24 | |
| 2.2.0 | 8 / 24 | |
| 2.1.0 | 8 / 24 | |
| 2.0.2 | 8 / 24 | |
| 2.0.1 | 8 / 24 | |
| 2.0.0 | 8 / 24 |
v2.5.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.4
5 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 5 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.5.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
4 findingsModified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 5 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.1
4 findingsModified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 5 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.