@babel/preset-stage-0
Babel preset for stage 0 plugins
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): nicolo-ribaudo is a well-known Babel core team member; the transition from hzoo is a documented legitimate maintainer change within the Babel project. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): developit and nicolo-ribaudo are recognized Babel ecosystem contributors; additions reflect legitimate Babel team evolution. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): xtuc removal is consistent with documented Babel team changes; no evidence of hostile takeover. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Official Babel monorepo package; flagged maintainers (hzoo, loganfsmyth, danez) are known Babel core team members, not spam. No-deps and no-keywords reflect intentional deprecation of stage presets. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Babel package predating Sigstore provenance adoption; published by a highly trusted publisher with strong track record. | ai |
v7.8.3
2 findingsMatched 4 signal(s), weighted score 8: • [S_KNOWN_SPAM_PUBLISHER] Maintainer(s) previously flagged as spam: hzoo, loganfsmyth, danez. • [S_PUBLISHER_MASS_PRODUCTION] Maintainer 'loganfsmyth' owns 167 packages, ≥70% share a templated name shape. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.