@babel/polyfill
Provides polyfills necessary for a full ES2015+ environment
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:browser.js | AI (source-diff): browser.js is a standard Browserify/UMD bundle of the polyfill — minified for distribution, not obfuscated for concealment. This is an expected artifact for a browser-targeted polyfill package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Spam-flagged maintainers (hzoo, loganfsmyth, danez) are well-known Babel core contributors; mass package production reflects Babel's monorepo structure, not spam. No keywords is benign for this established package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): nicolo-ribaudo is a known Babel core team member; the 2020 transition from jlhwung is a legitimate maintainer handoff within the Babel project. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Missing gitHead reflects a CI/CD pipeline change at Babel; not indicative of malicious activity for this well-established package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Published in 2020 before Sigstore/npm provenance was available; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this version. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.12.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 7.11.5 | 2 / 4 | |
| 7.10.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.10.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.8.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.8.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.8.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.7.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.6.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.4.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.4.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.4.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.2.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.2.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 7.0.0 | 2 / 0 |
v7.12.1
4 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nicolo-ribaudo.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-10-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Matched 3 signal(s), weighted score 7: • [S_KNOWN_SPAM_PUBLISHER] Maintainer(s) previously flagged as spam: hzoo, loganfsmyth, danez. • [S_PUBLISHER_MASS_PRODUCTION] Maintainer 'loganfsmyth' owns 167 packages, ≥70% share a templated name shape. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.11.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-08-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.10.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-06-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.8.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.8.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.4.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.4.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.4.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.5
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2018-12-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.