@babel/helper-plugin-utils
General utilities for plugins to use
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): nicolo-ribaudo is a well-known Babel core team maintainer; the jlhwung→nicolo-ribaudo transition in 2021 is a legitimate handoff within the Babel project, not a compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Missing gitHead reflects a publish environment change consistent with the maintainer transition; not a security signal for this established Babel package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): All bogus-package signals are false positives for @babel/helper-plugin-utils: Babel maintainers are legitimate, monorepo templated naming is by design, and tiny/no-dep helper packages are expected in the Babel ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): This version predates Sigstore provenance adoption; older Babel releases consistently lack provenance attestation. Not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 34 of 34)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.29.7 | 0 / 1 | |
| 7.28.6 | 0 / 1 | |
| 7.27.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 7.26.5 | 0 / 1 | |
| 7.25.9 | 0 / 1 | |
| 7.25.7 | 0 / 1 | |
| 7.24.8 | 0 / 1 | |
| 7.24.7 | 0 / 1 | |
| 7.24.6 | 0 / 1 | |
| 7.24.5 | 0 / 1 | |
| 7.24.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.22.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.21.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.20.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.19.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.18.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.18.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.17.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.16.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.16.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.14.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.13.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.12.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.10.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.10.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.10.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.8.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.8.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 8.0.0-rc.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 8.0.0-rc.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 8.0.0-rc.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 8.0.0-beta.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 8.0.0-beta.3 | 0 / 1 |
v7.29.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.27.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.26.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.25.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.25.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.24.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.24.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.24.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.24.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.24.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.22.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.21.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.20.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.19.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.18.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.18.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.17.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.16.7
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nicolo-ribaudo.
v7.16.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nicolo-ribaudo.
v7.14.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nicolo-ribaudo.
v7.13.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nicolo-ribaudo.
v7.12.13
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: nicolo-ribaudo.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.10.4
2 findingsMatched 5 signal(s), weighted score 9: • [S_KNOWN_SPAM_PUBLISHER] Maintainer(s) previously flagged as spam: hzoo, loganfsmyth, danez. • [S_PUBLISHER_MASS_PRODUCTION] Maintainer 'loganfsmyth' owns 167 packages, ≥70% share a templated name shape. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared. • [S_TINY_PAYLOAD] Tiny payload: 1 code file(s), 4055 bytes total.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.10.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-06-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.8.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.8.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.