@aws-crypto/sha256-browser
SHA256 wrapper for browsers that prefers `window.crypto.subtle` but will fall back to a pure JS implementation in @aws-crypto/sha256-js to provide a consistent interface for SHA256.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aws-crypto/ie11-detection | AI (dependencies): @aws-crypto/ie11-detection is an official AWS Crypto Tools package from the same monorepo and publisher; it is a legitimate dependency for this package across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from seebees to salkeldr reflects a legitimate AWS internal team transition; salkeldr has a strong track record (44 approved, 0 rejected) and the repo remains under the official aws GitHub org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers (salkeldr, agray256, jamesiri, lavaleri) are consistent with AWS team rotation; all additions align with the official AWS Crypto Tools ownership. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of jpeddicord alongside addition of multiple AWS team members is consistent with a legitimate internal handoff, not a takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established AWS Crypto Tools package published by official AWS CI bot; lack of Sigstore provenance is expected for packages of this age and does not indicate risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aws-crypto/util | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same AWS Crypto Tools monorepo; unvetted status is a pipeline artifact, not a real risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aws-crypto/sha256-js | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same AWS Crypto Tools monorepo; unvetted status is a pipeline artifact, not a real risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@smithy/util-utf8 | AI (phantom-deps): AWS SDK ecosystem package loaded by convention; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 5.1.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 5.0.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 1.2.2 | 7 / 0 | |
| 1.2.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 1.2.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 1.1.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 7 / 9 |
v2.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-09-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-10-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-10-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-09-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-09-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-07-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-01-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.