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@avalabs/avalanchejs

2
Versions
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures No source commit

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

mikiasibirbasmunkyanguyen0815jitenoswalalexariciujtannerfrichardscchevlivvavahiimoliverwangnahocabolosneven.sava_wingsdfenstermakerglovas

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance slsa-provenance AI (provenance): Official ava-labs CI/CD pipeline with Sigstore attestation; stable supply chain signal for this package. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with org-level CI/CD adoption; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate pipeline. ai

Versions (showing 2 of 2)

Version Deps Published
5.1.0 5 / 30
5.0.0 5 / 30

v5.1.0

3 findings
HIGH Complete maintainer takeover detected maintainer-change

All previous maintainers (javiertc86, glovas, meeh0w_ava, tony-snow, sayankar) were replaced by new maintainers (chriselbring-avalabs, des-ava). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

HIGH Publisher changed: glovas → GitHub Actions (on 2026-06-10) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.