@avalabs/avalanchejs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Official ava-labs CI/CD pipeline with Sigstore attestation; stable supply chain signal for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with org-level CI/CD adoption; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate pipeline. | ai |
v5.1.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (javiertc86, glovas, meeh0w_ava, tony-snow, sayankar) were replaced by new maintainers (chriselbring-avalabs, des-ava). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.