@augment-vir/assert
A collection of assertions for test and production code alike.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| license | uncommon-license:CC0 1.0 | AI (license): Package uses (MIT or CC0 1.0) dual license — both are well-known permissive licenses. This is a stable, benign characteristic of this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established monorepo package (146 versions, 605 days old) from consistent publisher; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 104)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 31.17.1 | 5 / 9 | |
| 31.17.0 | 5 / 9 | |
| 31.16.0 | 5 / 9 | |
| 31.15.0 | 5 / 9 |
v31.17.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.17.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.16.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.15.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.