@atlaskit/primitives
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/css | AI (dependencies): First-party Atlaskit sibling package published by the same Atlassian team; unvetted status is a registry gap, not a risk signal. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@compiled/react | AI (dependencies): Well-known Atlassian-maintained CSS-in-JS compiler; legitimate dependency for Atlaskit design system packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/ds-lib | AI (dependencies): First-party Atlaskit sibling package; unvetted status is a registry gap, not a risk signal. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/tokens | AI (dependencies): First-party Atlaskit design token package; standard dependency for Atlaskit UI components. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:bind-event-listener | AI (dependencies): Established utility package for event listener management; no malicious signals. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/app-provider | AI (dependencies): First-party Atlaskit sibling package; unvetted status is a registry gap, not a risk signal. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/analytics-next | AI (dependencies): First-party Atlaskit analytics package; standard dependency for Atlaskit UI components. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/visually-hidden | AI (dependencies): First-party Atlaskit accessibility utility; standard dependency for Atlaskit UI components. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/interaction-context | AI (dependencies): First-party Atlaskit sibling package; unvetted status is a registry gap, not a risk signal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Atlassian publishes via their artifact team pipeline without Sigstore provenance; consistent across all their packages and not a risk indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 22 of 22)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 19.0.1 | 13 / 37 | |
| 19.0.0 | 13 / 37 | |
| 18.1.4 | 13 / 37 | |
| 18.1.3 | 13 / 37 | |
| 18.1.2 | 13 / 36 | |
| 18.1.1 | 13 / 36 | |
| 18.1.0 | 13 / 36 | |
| 18.0.2 | 13 / 35 | |
| 18.0.1 | 13 / 35 | |
| 18.0.0 | 13 / 35 | |
| 17.1.1 | 13 / 35 | |
| 17.1.0 | 13 / 35 | |
| 17.0.0 | 13 / 36 | |
| 16.4.4 | 13 / 36 | |
| 16.4.3 | 13 / 36 | |
| 16.4.2 | 13 / 36 | |
| 16.4.1 | 13 / 36 | |
| 16.4.0 | 14 / 37 | |
| 16.3.0 | 14 / 37 | |
| 16.2.0 | 14 / 37 | |
| 16.1.1 | 14 / 37 | |
| 16.1.0 | 14 / 37 |
v19.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v19.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v18.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v18.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v18.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v18.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v17.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v17.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v17.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.4.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.4.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.