@atlaskit/portal
A wrapper for rendering components in React portals.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/theme | AI (dependencies): First-party Atlassian monorepo package; safe to treat as trusted for all @atlaskit/portal versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/app-provider | AI (dependencies): First-party Atlassian monorepo package; safe to treat as trusted for all @atlaskit/portal versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/platform-feature-flags | AI (dependencies): First-party Atlassian monorepo package; safe to treat as trusted for all @atlaskit/portal versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Atlassian publishes via their artifact team pipeline without Sigstore provenance; consistent across all versions, not a risk indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.5.6 | 4 / 27 | |
| 5.5.5 | 4 / 27 | |
| 5.5.4 | 4 / 27 | |
| 5.5.3 | 4 / 27 | |
| 5.5.2 | 4 / 25 | |
| 5.5.1 | 4 / 25 | |
| 5.5.0 | 4 / 25 | |
| 5.4.2 | 4 / 25 | |
| 5.4.1 | 4 / 25 | |
| 5.4.0 | 4 / 24 | |
| 5.3.2 | 4 / 24 | |
| 5.3.1 | 4 / 24 | |
| 5.3.0 | 4 / 24 | |
| 5.2.2 | 4 / 23 | |
| 5.2.1 | 4 / 23 | |
| 5.2.0 | 4 / 23 | |
| 5.1.8 | 3 / 26 | |
| 5.1.7 | 3 / 26 | |
| 5.1.6 | 3 / 26 | |
| 5.1.5 | 3 / 26 | |
| 5.1.4 | 3 / 26 | |
| 5.1.3 | 3 / 27 | |
| 5.1.2 | 3 / 27 | |
| 5.1.1 | 3 / 27 |
v5.5.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.