@apollo/federation-internals
Apollo Federation internal utilities
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Apollo Federation migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance attestation. The transition from individual account to GitHub Actions is a legitimate and more secure publishing pattern for this org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/uuid | AI (phantom-deps): @types/uuid is intentionally listed as a runtime dep in this package (pre-existing pattern); not a security concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.14.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.13.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.12.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.11.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.10.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.13.0-preview.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.13.0-preview.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.13.0-preview.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.12.0-preview.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.11.5-preview.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.11.5-preview.0 | 4 / 0 |
v2.14.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.13.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.12.3
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
v2.11.6
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.10.5
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.