@antv/s2
effective spreadsheet render core lib
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/s2-extends.min.js | AI (source-diff): Long strings are standard minified tslib/rollup output; stable false positive for this build artifact. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/s2.min.js | AI (source-diff): Long strings are standard minified tslib/rollup output; stable false positive for this build artifact. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped @antv/s2 is an established AntV package; Levenshtein match to 'pg' is a false positive. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped @antv/s2 is an established AntV package; Levenshtein match to 'qs' is a false positive. | ai |
v2.7.1
3 findingsModified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.