All @antv/matrix-util versions
@antv/matrix-util @3.1.4
Maintainers
Keywords
Dependencies (3)
| Package | Constraint | Registry Status |
|---|---|---|
| tslib | ^2.0.3 | auto_approved |
| gl-matrix | ^3.3.0 | auto_approved |
| @antv/util | ^2.0.9 | No greenflagged match |
Dev Dependencies (3)
| Package | Constraint | Registry Status |
|---|---|---|
| less | ^3.9.0 | auto_approved |
| @antv/torch | ^1.0.0 | Not imported |
| npm-run-all | ^4.1.5 | auto_approved |
Transitive Dependency Tree
Changes from v3.0.4
Dependency Changes
Script Changes
+ preinstallFile Changes
Risk Dispositions (6 applicable to this version, 0 other)
Accepted rules are downgraded to INFO on future analyses; rejected rules escalate to CRITICAL.
| Rule | Source | Disposition | Author | Reason | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
install-script:preinstall |
install-scripts | reject | AI | AI (install-scripts): Malicious preinstall running obfuscated payload; generalizes to this package. | |
obfuscated-file:index.js |
source-diff | reject | AI | AI (source-diff): Obfuscated 498KB payload is not legitimate for a matrix-util library. | |
url-dep:@antv/setup |
npm-metadata | reject | AI | AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned GitHub dep in optionalDependencies smuggling payload past registry checks. | |
semgrep:env-spread |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): Credential harvesting via process.env spread inside obfuscated code. | |
semgrep:obfuscation-while-true |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): javascript-obfuscator output in a utility package is malicious. | |
semgrep:obfuscation-hex-functions |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): Hex-named functions confirm javascript-obfuscator; malicious payload. |
SAST Findings (9)
Script: bun run index.js
Dependency '@antv/setup' in `optionalDependencies` points to 'github:antvis/G2#1916faa365f2788b6e193514872d51a242876569' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
while(!![]) loop is a signature of javascript-obfuscator output > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
Review Summary
Risk score: 100 (capped from 243). Findings: 8 high (+200), 4 medium (+40), 1 low (+3), 2 info (+0).
Published to npm: