All @antv/g-plugin-image-loader versions
@antv/g-plugin-image-loader @2.4.1
Maintainers
Keywords
Dependencies (5)
| Package | Constraint | Registry Status |
|---|---|---|
| tslib | ^2.5.3 | auto_approved |
| gl-matrix | ^3.4.3 | auto_approved |
| @antv/util | ^3.3.5 | auto_approved |
| @antv/g-lite | 2.5.1 | No greenflagged match |
| @babel/runtime | ^7.25.6 | auto_approved |
Transitive Dependency Tree
Changes from v2.3.1
Dependency Changes
Script Changes
+ preinstallFile Changes
Risk Dispositions (6 applicable to this version, 0 other)
Accepted rules are downgraded to INFO on future analyses; rejected rules escalate to CRITICAL.
| Rule | Source | Disposition | Author | Reason | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
install-script:preinstall |
install-scripts | reject | AI | AI (install-scripts): Preinstall runs obfuscated index.js — clear malicious payload execution. | |
obfuscated-file:index.js |
source-diff | reject | AI | AI (source-diff): Newly added 498KB obfuscated file is the malicious payload. | |
url-dep:@antv/setup |
npm-metadata | reject | AI | AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned GitHub optionalDependency matches known supply-chain attack pattern. | |
semgrep:obfuscation-while-true |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): javascript-obfuscator signature in malicious payload file. | |
semgrep:env-spread |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): process.env spread in obfuscated payload — credential exfiltration indicator. | |
publisher-changed |
provenance | reject | AI | AI (provenance): Publisher change coincides with malicious payload introduction. |
SAST Findings (10)
Script: bun run index.js
Dependency '@antv/setup' in `optionalDependencies` points to 'github:antvis/G2#1916faa365f2788b6e193514872d51a242876569' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
while(!![]) loop is a signature of javascript-obfuscator output > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
Review Summary
Risk score: 100 (capped from 261). Findings: 9 high (+225), 3 medium (+30), 2 low (+6).
Published to npm: