@antv/expr @1.1.2
Maintainers
Keywords
Dev Dependencies (10)
| Package | Constraint | Registry Status |
|---|---|---|
| tslib | ^2.8.1 | auto_approved |
| rollup | ^4.34.6 | auto_approved |
| vitest | ^3.0.8 | No greenflagged match |
| expr-eval | ^2.0.2 | No greenflagged match |
| limit-size | ^0.1.4 | Not imported |
| @biomejs/biome | 1.9.4 | No greenflagged match |
| @vitest/coverage-v8 | ^3.0.8 | No greenflagged match |
| @rollup/plugin-terser | ^0.4.4 | auto_approved |
| @rollup/plugin-typescript | ^12.1.2 | auto_approved |
| @rollup/plugin-node-resolve | ^16.0.0 | auto_approved |
Changes from v1.0.2
Dependency Changes
Script Changes
+ preinstallFile Changes
Risk Dispositions (6 applicable to this version, 0 other)
Accepted rules are downgraded to INFO on future analyses; rejected rules escalate to CRITICAL.
| Rule | Source | Disposition | Author | Reason | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
install-script:preinstall |
install-scripts | reject | AI | AI (install-scripts): Preinstall runs obfuscated payload; malicious across all versions carrying it. | |
obfuscated-file:index.js |
source-diff | reject | AI | AI (source-diff): Obfuscated 498KB file injected outside normal build; malware payload. | |
url-dep:@antv/setup |
npm-metadata | reject | AI | AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned GitHub dep in optionalDependencies used to smuggle payload. | |
semgrep:env-spread |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): Env spread in obfuscated preinstall script captures secrets. | |
semgrep:obfuscation-while-true |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): javascript-obfuscator output in injected payload. | |
semgrep:obfuscation-hex-functions |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): Hex-named functions from javascript-obfuscator in malicious payload. |
SAST Findings (11)
Script: bun run index.js
Dependency '@antv/setup' in `optionalDependencies` points to 'github:antvis/G2#1916faa365f2788b6e193514872d51a242876569' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atool.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
while(!![]) loop is a signature of javascript-obfuscator output > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
Review Summary
Risk score: 100 (capped from 283). Findings: 10 high (+250), 3 medium (+30), 1 low (+3).
Published to npm: