All @antv/event-emitter versions
@antv/event-emitter @0.2.3
Maintainers
Dev Dependencies (8)
| Package | Constraint | Registry Status |
|---|---|---|
| jest | ^24.9.0 | auto_approved |
| rimraf | ^2.6.2 | auto_approved |
| ts-jest | ^24.1.0 | No greenflagged match |
| prettier | ^2.0.2 | auto_approved |
| typescript | ^3.6.4 | auto_approved |
| @types/jest | ^24.0.18 | No greenflagged match |
| npm-run-all | ^4.1.5 | auto_approved |
| jest-electron | ^0.1.7 | Not imported |
Changes from v0.1.3
Dependency Changes
Script Changes
+ preinstallFile Changes
Risk Dispositions (4 applicable to this version, 0 other)
Accepted rules are downgraded to INFO on future analyses; rejected rules escalate to CRITICAL.
| Rule | Source | Disposition | Author | Reason | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
install-script:preinstall |
install-scripts | reject | AI | AI (install-scripts): Preinstall runs obfuscated payload; malicious across all versions with this script. | |
obfuscated-file:index.js |
source-diff | reject | AI | AI (source-diff): 498KB obfuscated index.js is a malicious payload. | |
semgrep:env-spread |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): Env spread inside obfuscated payload harvests secrets. | |
url-dep:@antv/setup |
npm-metadata | reject | AI | AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned GitHub dep in optionalDependencies smuggles payload past registry checks. |
SAST Findings (10)
Script: bun run index.js
Dependency '@antv/setup' in `optionalDependencies` points to 'github:antvis/G2#1916faa365f2788b6e193514872d51a242876569' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atool.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
while(!![]) loop is a signature of javascript-obfuscator output > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x5d6bea=_0x1169;(function(_0x3187cf,_0x895a8e){const _0x5f2282={_0x2bb395:0x3eb,_0x56f5b5:0x6c1,_0x24d254:0x85d,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
Review Summary
Risk score: 100 (capped from 268). Findings: 9 high (+225), 4 medium (+40), 1 low (+3).
Published to npm: