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@algolia/client-abtesting

51
Versions
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

ejaldorauharoenvrayrutjesjerskasamousstherealwebbytkruggsylvainhlorrissaintgenezbroujoe-krebskombuchasylvaincrawler-teamamcdaid106devinalgoliajveneziaotomatiksarahdayanmaximehuangguitekmatthewbondshaejazcyril.descossytatsuromathouguixavdhagdavidrasemotteplnechshortcutspraagyajoshialphonsebleodaufabienmottedaltondickalgoliadhaya.bbengreenbankalgabetalg-bgastinneemmanuel.fortindylantientcheuandy_dsrobertmogosjcohonner-algoliacatalgoliaraed-algoliaaymeric.giraudetpjankowski5312eventexperiences_algoliataylorcjohnson_algoliasfaiqhinstantsearch-botflufleviwhalenabodelotmprevell97jkahoantoine.gilleswwalserbhinchley-algolialouishousiauxjsok_algoliaalg-adminhugowitmariamthiam01drodrigulnscyganek-algoliajasonberrybhcastlegavinwade12vascobettencourtmariaaalungucdhawke-algoliafelipe-bernalmorgan-algolia2sirockin_algoliajulia-francaisjcalgoaallam.algtecu23nyagudayevsamykettanijonathaningrammarioalgoliamasterstrikeoctavianiacobminjaslavkoviceric-zahariacmarguta-algoliaharsharora-algoliablaineventurinesarahdayanalgoliagavaudan-algoliamszmaj-algoliayutodalgsamyphilboothcarloscamposfredalgoliawabascript2lotfirafiklachlan.robertson

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Algolia transitioned to GitHub Actions for automated publishing with SLSA provenance; this is a supply chain improvement, not a compromise signal. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers (sirockin_algolia, nyagudayev) have Algolia-branded names consistent with legitimate internal team changes at Algolia. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@algolia/requester-node-http AI (dependencies): First-party Algolia sibling package from the same monorepo, always released in lockstep at the same version. Unvetted status reflects review queue lag, not a security concern. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@algolia/requester-browser-xhr AI (dependencies): First-party Algolia sibling package from the same monorepo, always released in lockstep at the same version. Unvetted status reflects review queue lag, not a security concern. ai

Versions (showing 51 of 96)

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Version Deps Published
5.53.0 4 / 6
5.52.1 4 / 6
5.52.0 4 / 6
5.51.0 4 / 6
5.50.2 4 / 6
5.50.1 4 / 6
5.50.0 4 / 6
5.49.2 4 / 6
5.49.1 4 / 6
5.49.0 4 / 6
5.48.2 4 / 6
5.48.1 4 / 6
5.48.0 4 / 6
5.47.0 4 / 6
5.46.4 4 / 6
5.46.3 4 / 6
5.46.2 4 / 6
5.46.1 4 / 6
5.46.0 4 / 6
5.45.0 4 / 6
5.44.0 4 / 6
5.43.0 4 / 6
5.42.0 4 / 6
5.41.0 4 / 6
5.40.1 4 / 6
5.40.0 4 / 6
5.39.0 4 / 6
5.38.0 4 / 6
5.37.0 4 / 6
5.36.0 4 / 6
5.35.0 4 / 6
5.34.1 4 / 6
5.34.0 4 / 6
5.33.0 4 / 6
5.32.0 4 / 6
5.31.0 4 / 6
5.30.0 4 / 6
5.29.0 4 / 6
5.28.0 4 / 6
5.27.0 4 / 6
5.26.0 4 / 6
5.25.0 4 / 6
5.24.0 4 / 6
5.23.4 4 / 6
5.23.3 4 / 6
5.23.2 4 / 6
5.23.1 4 / 6
5.23.0 4 / 6
5.22.0 4 / 6
5.21.0 4 / 6
5.20.4 4 / 6

v5.53.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.52.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.52.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.51.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.50.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.50.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.50.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.49.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.49.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.49.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.48.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.48.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.48.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: shortcuts → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-05) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.47.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: shortcuts → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.46.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: shortcuts → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.46.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: shortcuts → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.46.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: shortcuts → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.46.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: shortcuts → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v5.46.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.45.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.44.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.43.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.42.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v5.41.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.40.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.40.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.39.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.38.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.37.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.36.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.35.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.34.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.34.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.33.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.32.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.31.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.30.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.29.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v5.28.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v5.27.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v5.26.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v5.25.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v5.24.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v5.23.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.23.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.23.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.23.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.23.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.22.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.21.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.20.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.