@algolia/autocomplete-js
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Algolia org package with 88 versions; dormancy reflects org publishing cadence, not takeover risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.19.8 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.19.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.19.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.19.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.19.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.19.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.19.2 | 5 / 1 |
v1.19.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.19.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.19.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.19.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.19.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.19.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.19.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.