@algolia/autocomplete-core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Algolia's publish pipeline does not use Sigstore provenance; consistent across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.19.8 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.19.7 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.19.6 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.19.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.19.4 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.19.3 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.19.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.19.1 | 2 / 3 |
v1.19.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.19.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.19.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.19.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.19.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.19.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.19.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.19.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.