@ai-sdk/react
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Vercel migrated from vercel-release-bot to GitHub Actions CI; SLSA attestation confirms legitimacy. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers matheuss and matt.straka are Vercel employees; this is a documented internal transition. Publisher remains vercel-release-bot. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): jaredpalmer's removal reflects a known Vercel org transition; not indicative of takeover given vercel-release-bot remains the publisher. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Apparent dormancy is an artifact of the large version gap (v1.1.8 to v3.0.141) between last approved and current. Package has 850 versions and 5.2M weekly downloads — continuously active. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dep 'ai' is the core Vercel AI SDK package replacing @ai-sdk/ui-utils; a legitimate architectural consolidation within the same trusted org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): vercel-release-bot is a well-established publisher with 4383 approved packages; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a meaningful risk signal for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 306)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.195 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.194 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.193 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.192 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.191 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.190 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.189 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.187 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.186 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.185 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.184 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.182 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.180 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.179 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.178 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.177 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.176 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.175 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.174 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.173 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.172 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.171 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.170 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.169 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.168 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.167 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.166 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.165 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.164 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.163 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.162 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.161 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.160 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.159 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.158 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.157 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.156 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.155 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.154 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.153 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.152 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.151 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.150 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.149 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.148 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.147 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.146 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.145 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.144 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.143 | 4 / 14 | |
| 3.0.142 | 4 / 14 |
v3.0.195
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.194
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.193
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.192
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.191
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.190
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.189
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.187
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.186
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.185
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.184
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.182
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.180
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.179
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.178
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.177
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.176
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.175
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.174
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.173
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.172
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.171
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.170
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.169
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.168
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.167
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.166
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.165
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.164
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.163
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.162
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.161
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.160
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.159
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.158
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.157
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.156
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.155
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.154
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.153
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.152
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.151
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.150
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.149
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.148
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.147
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.146
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.145
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.144
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.143
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.142
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.