@ai-sdk/provider
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Bundled TypeScript declaration file with long type-union lines; not obfuscated. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Sub-package in vercel/ai monorepo; missing description is a metadata gap, not a security signal. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate transition from jaredpalmer (Vercel employee) to vercel-release-bot (Vercel's CI/CD bot with 592 approved packages). Standard org practice. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): vercel-release-bot added as maintainer for automated publishing; well-established Vercel bot account. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): @ai-sdk/provider uses 0.0.0 as a monorepo placeholder version; with 16M weekly downloads and 140 registry versions, this is a well-established legitimate package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Sparse README and description are typical of monorepo sub-packages in the Vercel AI SDK; not indicative of spam or malicious intent. | ai |
Versions (showing 58 of 58)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.10 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.9 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.8 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.7 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.6 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.5 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.0.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.0.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.1.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.1.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.12 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.11 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.10 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.9 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.8 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.7 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.6 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.5 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.26 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.24 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.23 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.22 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.21 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.20 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.19 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.18 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.17 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.16 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.15 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.14 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.13 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.12 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.11 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.10 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.9 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.8 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.7 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.6 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.0 | 1 / 5 |
v3.0.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.9
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.