@ai-sdk/provider-utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Minor metadata gap; package is clearly legitimate with 17M weekly downloads. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate transition from jaredpalmer (Vercel employee) to vercel-release-bot (Vercel's automated release account). Both are within the Vercel org. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Consistent with move to bot-based CI/CD publishing at Vercel; not a security concern for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): vercel-release-bot added as part of standard Vercel org transition to automated releases. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Version 0.0.0 is a known monorepo workspace placeholder pattern used by the Vercel AI SDK; not indicative of malicious intent for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): 17M weekly downloads and 738-day history confirm this is a legitimate, high-value package despite sparse README/description metadata. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 270)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.27 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.26 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.25 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.24 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.23 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.22 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.21 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.20 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.19 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.18 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.17 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.16 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.15 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.14 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.13 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.12 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.11 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.10 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.9 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.8 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.7 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.6 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.5 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.4 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.3 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 4.0.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.25 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.24 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.23 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.22 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.21 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.20 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.19 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.18 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.17 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.16 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.15 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.14 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.13 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.12 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.11 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.10 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.9 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.8 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.7 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.6 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.0.5 | 4 / 6 | |
| 3.0.4 | 4 / 6 | |
| 3.0.3 | 4 / 6 | |
| 3.0.2 | 4 / 6 | |
| 3.0.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 3.0.0 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.2.8 | 3 / 6 | |
| 2.2.7 | 3 / 6 | |
| 2.2.6 | 3 / 6 | |
| 2.2.5 | 3 / 6 | |
| 2.2.4 | 3 / 6 | |
| 2.2.3 | 3 / 6 | |
| 2.2.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 2.2.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 2.2.0 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.15 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.14 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.13 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.12 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.11 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.10 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.9 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.8 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.7 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.6 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.5 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.4 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.3 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.2 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.1.0 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.0.8 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.0.7 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.0.6 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.0.5 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.0.4 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.0.3 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.0.2 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.0.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.0.0 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.22 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.20 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.19 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.18 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.17 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.16 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.15 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.14 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.13 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.12 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.11 | 4 / 6 | |
| 1.0.10 | 4 / 6 |
v4.0.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.24
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.0.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.