@agentuity/drizzle
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Agentuity org package with consistent publish cadence; single missing gitHead not indicative of supply-chain compromise. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): better-auth is an established auth library; addition in a Drizzle integration is contextually appropriate. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): p0tofpie is a high-volume trusted publisher (1307 approved) within the same Agentuity org; consistent with an internal account transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): p0tofpie is an established publisher (1046 approved packages) within the @agentuity org; transition appears legitimate. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Org-published package; absence of Sigstore provenance is common and no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 111)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.45 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.44 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.43 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.42 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.41 | 3 / 4 |
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.45
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.