@agentuity/aigateway
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Publisher has strong track record; likely a CI/build environment change within the same org, not a supply chain indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal org package; missing description is a style issue, not a malware signal. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dep is @agentuity/server, a same-org sibling at matching version — not a third-party supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal org package; missing metadata is expected for private/org-scoped packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Org package published via bun; no provenance is consistent across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 23)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.9 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.8 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.7 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.6 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 3.0.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.0.27 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.26 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.25 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.24 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.23 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.22 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.21 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.20 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.19 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.18 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.17 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.16 | 3 / 4 | |
| 2.0.15 | 3 / 4 |
v3.0.9
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: p0tofpie.
v3.0.8
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jhaynie) than the most recent previously approved version (huijiro) on 2026-06-09, but jhaynie is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.0.7
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: huijiro.
v3.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.27
3 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: p0tofpie.
This version was published by a different npm account (p0tofpie) than the most recent previously approved version (jhaynie) on 2026-06-10, but p0tofpie is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.26
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: huijiro.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.25
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: huijiro.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.24
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: huijiro.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.23
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: huijiro.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.22
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: p0tofpie.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (p0tofpie) than the most recent previously approved version (huijiro) on 2026-05-27, but p0tofpie is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.