@actions/http-client
Actions Http Client
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:undici | AI (dependencies): Undici is a legitimate, widely-used HTTP client library; appropriate for this package's purpose. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dependency is undici, an established HTTP library; semantically appropriate and from trusted maintainer. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to the official 'GitHub Actions' org account — a legitimate centralization of publishing for the actions/toolkit monorepo. SLSA attestation confirms CI/CD provenance. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Added maintainers (cschleiden, bdehamer, joshmgross) are known GitHub Actions team members; consistent with org-level team management. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of hross is consistent with normal team roster changes within the GitHub Actions org; no takeover indicators given SLSA attestation. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Published in 2022 before Sigstore/npm provenance was standard; @actions scope is GitHub-controlled. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.0.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.2.3 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.2.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.2.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.0.11 | 1 / 7 | |
| 1.0.9 | 1 / 7 | |
| 1.0.8 | 1 / 7 |
v4.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.